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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Tamara Santarelli appeals the District Court’s denial of 
her motion to amend (“Motion to Amend”) her initial habeas 
petition.  We also consider whether the petition (“Subsequent 
Petition”) that Santarelli seeks to file in the District Court, 
which she annexed to the motion (“Motion to File Subsequent 
Petition”) that she filed in this Court during the pendency of 
this appeal, constitutes a “second or successive” habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h).  For the reasons 
that follow, we hold that the allegations contained in 
Santarelli’s Motion to Amend “relate back” to the date of her 
initial habeas petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c) and that her Subsequent Petition is not a 
“second or successive” habeas petition within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h).  We therefore will reverse the 
order of the District Court denying Santarelli’s Motion to 
Amend; remand for the District Court to consider the merits of 
her initial habeas petition as amended by the allegations 
contained in the Motion to Amend; and, construing Santarelli’s 
Motion to File Subsequent Petition as a motion to amend her 
initial habeas petition, transfer the Motion to File Subsequent 
Petition to the District Court to determine, in the first instance, 
whether Santarelli should be permitted to amend her initial 
habeas petition to incorporate the allegations contained in the 
Subsequent Petition.  
I. 
 In October 2011, a jury convicted Santarelli of multiple 
crimes in connection with a scheme that allegedly began in 
2006, including (a) mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341–1342; (b) wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; 
and (c) conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, in 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.1  The District Court held a 
sentencing hearing in October 2013 and, applying the 
applicable sentencing range contained in the 2012 version of 
the United States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines 
Manual (“Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”), sentenced 
Santarelli to a seventy-month term of imprisonment and a 
three-year term of supervised release.  Santarelli timely filed a 
notice of appeal, and, on August 21, 2014, our Court affirmed 
her conviction.  See United States v. Santarelli, 577 F. App’x 
131 (3d Cir. 2014).  Santarelli’s conviction became final on 
December 12, 2014. 
 On November 30, 2015, within the applicable one-year 
statute of limitations, Santarelli timely filed a petition for 
habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  In her initial habeas 
petition, Santarelli alleged, among other things, that her trial 
and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in a 
combined 130 ways, including: 
• “failure to appeal sentence as requested by 
[Santarelli],” App. 97a, no. 26; 
• “failure to argue [presentence investigation 
report (“]PSR[”)] errors at sentencing,” id. no. 
30; 
• “failure to appeal PSR errors,” id. no. 31; 
                                                 
1  The jury also convicted Santarelli’s husband of the 
same crimes.  Because this appeal only relates to Santarelli, we 
have omitted all details with respect to her husband because 
they are not relevant to the issues before us. 
 5 
• “failure to discuss PSR with [Santarelli],” id. no. 
32; 
• “failure to discuss [and] advise [Santarelli of] the 
[S]entencing [G]uidelines, laws, rules[,] or 
otherwise,” id. no. 33; 
• “failure to prepare . . . before sentencing other 
than [to] read the PSR,” id. at 98a, no. 35; 
• “failure to argue [in opposition to] the number of 
victims enhancement of two (2) points [and]/or 
failure to argue effectively [in opposition 
thereto,] which increased [Santarelli]’s sentence 
[by] around . . . twelve[ ]months,” id. no. 42; and 
• “failure to appeal based on [the number of 
victims enhancement],” id. no. 43. 
On August 15, 2016—approximately eight-and-a-half months 
after filing her initial habeas petition, but while her initial 
habeas petition was still pending before the District Court—
Santarelli filed her Motion to Amend.  In the Motion to Amend, 
Santarelli sought to amend her initial habeas petition to 
“include” in the “multiple grounds and constitutional 
violations . . . that specifically relate to enhancements, 
sentencing[,] and [S]entencing [G]uidelines” the following 
allegations: 
• “[Santarelli] received ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to object to, file post-
sentencing motions against the use of, or file any 
appeal against the use of the 2012 [S]entencing 
[G]uidelines[,] as [Santarelli]’s sentence was 
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mis[]calculated in violation of the EX POST 
FACTO CLAUSE of the U[.]S[.] Constitution,” 
id. at 104a–05a; 
• “[t]he use of the 2012 [S]entencing [G]uidelines 
resulted in actual harm to [Santarelli] in that 
more persons were allowed to be counted as 
‘victims’ under the 2012 [G]uidelines than 
would have been allowable in 2006, 2007, or 
2008, the time that it is claimed that the offenses 
were committed,” id. at 105a; 
• “the [S]entencing [G]uidelines that [Santarelli] 
should have been sentenced under were either 
the 2006 or the 2007 [G]uidelines or both” 
because Santarelli “was indicted on crimes that 
were supposedly committed in 2006 and 2007,” 
id. at 104a; and 
• “[i]n 2009, the [G]uidelines were broadened by 
definition,” id. at 105a. 
To justify the untimeliness of her Motion to Amend, Santarelli 
argued that the allegations contained in her Motion to Amend 
“relate back” to her initial habeas petition pursuant to Rule 
15(c) because she “made . . . prior claims to the issue of 
erroneous enhancements [with respect to] victims as well as 
other erroneous enhancements” in her initial habeas petition.  
Id. at 103a. 
 The District Court denied Santarelli’s Motion to 
Amend, finding that it was “not timely and . . . time-barred.”  
Id. at 6a.  It reasoned that the new allegations contained in the 
Motion to Amend did not “relate back” to the initial habeas 
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petition pursuant to Rule 15(c) because the allegations 
“attempt[ed] to add an ex post facto claim,” which the District 
Court determined to be “a ‘completely new’ ground or theory 
for relief” that could not be “deemed timely under the ‘relation 
back’ provisions of Rule[  ]15(c).”  Id. (citing United States v. 
Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 435 (3d Cir. 2000)).  In addition to 
denying the Motion to Amend, the District Court denied 
Santarelli’s initial habeas petition on the merits. 
 Santarelli then filed an application for a certificate of 
appealability in this Court.  We granted the application solely 
on the issue of whether the District Court erred in denying 
Santarelli’s Motion to Amend, and we directed the Clerk of 
Court to appoint pro bono counsel to represent Santarelli in this 
appeal.2 
 Following the close of briefing, but prior to oral 
argument, Santarelli, proceeding pro se, filed her Motion to 
File Subsequent Petition in this Court.  The Motion to File 
Subsequent Petition initially was docketed as a separate matter 
from the appeal with respect to the Motion to Amend, but we 
subsequently consolidated the cases and appointed Santarelli’s 
pro bono counsel to represent her with respect to the Motion to 
File Subsequent Petition.  We directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing whether the Subsequent 
Petition is in fact a “second or successive” habeas petition 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h). 
                                                 
2  We denied a certificate of appealability with respect to 
the District Court’s denial of Santarelli’s initial habeas petition 
on the merits. 
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II. 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over 
Santarelli’s initial habeas petition and the Motion to Amend 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We have jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s denial of Santarelli’s Motion to Amend 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) because we issued a certificate 
of appealability with respect thereto.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(1).  We review a district court’s interpretation of the 
timeliness of a motion and the relation-back doctrine de novo.  
Hodge v. United States, 554 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We have original jurisdiction to consider the Motion to 
File Subsequent Petition because Santarelli styled the motion 
as one for leave to file a “second or successive” habeas petition, 
a motion that must be filed in this Court in the first instance.3  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 
                                                 
3  Although Santarelli filed her Motion to File Subsequent 
Petition pro se following our appointment of pro bono counsel 
to represent her on appeal with respect to the District Court’s 
denial of her Motion to Amend, she did not violate the 
prohibition on “hybrid representation.”  That prohibition is 
contained in our local rules, which state that “parties 
represented by counsel may not file a brief pro se” except in a 
direct appeal in which counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  3d Cir. L.A.R. 
31.3; see also United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 578 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“Pro se litigants have no right to ‘hybrid 
representation’ because ‘[a] defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by 
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III. 
 Santarelli argues that the District Court erred in finding 
that the allegations contained in her Motion to Amend do not 
“relate back” to her initial habeas petition pursuant to Rule 
15(c).  We agree, and thus we will reverse. 
 Pursuant to Rule 15(c), an amendment that is otherwise 
untimely “relates back to the date of the original pleading when 
. . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted 
to be set out—in the original pleading.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(c)(1)(B).  The Supreme Court has cautioned that courts 
should not interpret “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” in 
such a broad manner so as to construe essentially all 
                                                 
counsel.’” (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 
(1984))). 
 In this case, however, we initially appointed counsel to 
represent Santarelli for the specific purpose of representing her 
during her appeal of the District Court’s denial of her Motion 
to Amend, which was docketed at No. 16-4114.  Thus, we did 
not appoint counsel to represent Santarelli in any other 
capacity.  We previously acknowledged that Santarelli was 
unrepresented for purposes of the Motion to File Subsequent 
Petition.  In addition to consolidating case No. 16-4114 with 
the case in which Santarelli had filed the Motion to File 
Subsequent Petition—which was docketed at No. 18-1362—in 
our order, we appointed Santarelli’s pro bono counsel to 
represent her in case No. 18-1362.  In so doing, we implicitly 
recognized that Santarelli previously was not represented by 
counsel for purposes of her prior filing of the Motion to File 
Subsequent Petition in case No. 18-1362. 
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amendments as permissible under the relation-back doctrine.  
See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656–57 (2005).  For example, 
in the habeas context, the Supreme Court has refused to 
interpret “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as broadly 
encompassing a “habeas petitioner’s trial, conviction, or 
sentence,” reasoning that “[u]nder that comprehensive 
definition, virtually any new claim introduced in an amended 
petition will relate back, for federal habeas claims, by their 
very nature, challenge the constitutionality of a conviction or 
sentence, and commonly attack proceedings anterior thereto.”  
Id.  Instead, it has counseled that an amendment relates back to 
a habeas petition under Rule 15(c) “[s]o long as the original 
and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common 
core of operative facts.”  Id. at 664 (emphasis added). 
 In “search[ing] for a common core of operative facts in 
the two pleadings,” Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 
310 (3d Cir. 2004), courts should remain aware that “the 
touchstone for relation back is fair notice, because Rule 15(c) 
is premised on the theory that ‘a party who has been notified 
of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given 
all the notice that statutes of limitations were intended to 
provide,’” Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2012).  
“Thus, only where the opposing party is given ‘fair notice of 
the general fact situation and the legal theory upon which the 
amending party proceeds’ will relation back be allowed.”  
Glover, 698 F.3d at 146 (quoting Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310).  For 
example, we have held that “amendments that restate the 
original claim with greater particularity or amplify the factual 
circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, 
transaction[,] or occurrence in the preceding pleading fall 
within Rule 15(c)” because the opposing party will have had 
sufficient notice of the circumstances surrounding the 
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allegations contained in the amendment.  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 
310. 
 Here, the allegations contained in Santarelli’s initial 
habeas petition and the Motion to Amend arise from a common 
core of operative facts.  In her initial habeas petition, Santarelli 
alleged that her trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by, among other things, allegedly failing to argue, at 
sentencing or on appeal, that the PSR included certain errors, 
including an errant calculation with respect to the number-of-
victims enhancement.  See App. 97a nos. 30–31; 98a nos. 42–
43.  In her Motion to Amend, Santarelli simply seeks to 
supplement her initial habeas petition by providing an 
explanation as to why her counsel was ineffective by failing to 
raise these alleged errors at sentencing and on appeal.  In 
particular, she alleges that she would not have been eligible for 
the number-of-victims enhancement pursuant to section 
2B1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines under the versions of 
the Guidelines that were in effect at the time of her alleged 
criminal activity in 2006 and 2007.  According to Santarelli, 
the PSR, which the District Court relied upon at sentencing, 
used the 2012 version of the Guidelines, which contained a 
broader definition of who may be considered a “victim” for 
purposes of determining eligibility for the number-of-victims 
enhancement, thereby resulting in her being eligible for the 
enhancement and receiving a higher Guidelines range than she 
would have received under the 2006 and 2007 versions of the 
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Guidelines.4  Thus, Santarelli seeks to clarify the cause of her 
counsels’ alleged ineffectiveness with respect to their failure to 
                                                 
4  In her Motion to Amend, Santarelli argued that “more 
persons were allowed to be counted as ‘victims’ under the 2012 
[G]uidelines than would have been allowable in 2006 [or] 
2007.”  App. 105a.  Indeed, the Sentencing Commission 
amended the Sentencing Guidelines in 2009 by, among other 
things, broadening the class of persons who could be 
considered “victims” in theft-offense cases in which the 
defendant unlawfully used the “means of identification” of the 
victim.  See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 4 (May 1, 2009), https://www.ussc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-text-
amendments/20090501_Amendments_0 .pdf.  In such cases, a 
person “whose means of identification was used unlawfully or 
without authority” is considered a “victim” of the crime, see 
U.S.S.G.§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E), whereas under prior versions of 
the Guidelines, only persons “who sustained any part of the 
actual loss” were considered “victims” of the crime, id. cmt. 
n.1.  Thus, under the broader definition that was instituted by 
the 2009 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, more 
persons qualify as “victims” for purposes of the number-of-
victims enhancement under section 2B1.1(b)(2) of the 
Guidelines, which increases the offense level of a crime based 
on the number of victims involved.  See U.S.S.G.§ 2B1.1(b)(2) 
(increasing the offense level by two, four, and six levels for 
offenses involving ten or more victims, fifty or more victims, 
and 250 or more victims, respectively). 
 Although neither a transcript of the sentencing hearing 
nor a copy of the PSR can be located on the District Court’s 
docket or the Appendix in this case, Santarelli’s objections to 
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argue that the District Court erred finding that she was eligible 
for the number-of-victims enhancement.  To her, that error 
stems from their failure to argue that the District Court should 
not have used the 2012 version of the Guidelines, which 
allegedly resulted in a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of 
the United States Constitution because her Guidelines range 
would have been lower under the 2006 and 2007 versions of 
the Guidelines.  See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 
(2013) (“[A]pplying amended sentencing guidelines that 
increase a defendant’s recommended sentence can violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, notwithstanding the fact that sentencing 
courts possess discretion to deviate from the recommended 
sentencing range.”). 
 These allegations merely are “amendments that restate 
the original claim with greater particularity or amplify the 
factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, 
transaction[,] or occurrence in the preceding pleading,” and 
therefore the allegations contained in the Motion to Amend 
“fall within Rule 15(c)” and relate back to the date of 
                                                 
the PSR imply that the District Court indeed found that 
Santarelli was eligible for the number-of-victims enhancement 
under section 2B1.1(b)(2) of the 2012 version of the 
Guidelines. Further, Santarelli’s crimes may have involved the 
unlawful use of one or more identifications of her victims, and, 
pursuant to the 2009 amendments to the Guidelines, they 
would qualify as “victims” for purposes of the number-of-
victims enhancement.  Therefore, it is at least possible that the 
District Court’s application of the amended 2012 version of the 
Guidelines, rather than the 2006 or 2007 versions, may have 
affected Santarelli’s eligibility for the number-of-victims 
enhancement. 
 14 
Santarelli’s initial habeas petition.  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310.  As 
outlined above, in her Motion to Amend, Santarelli simply 
seeks to restate her original claim—that her trial and appellate 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that 
the District Court erred in determining that she was eligible for 
the number-of-victims enhancement—with greater 
particularity:  namely, she would not have been eligible for the 
number-of-victims enhancement under the 2006 or 2007 
versions of the Guidelines, which were in effect at the time of 
her alleged crimes, and her counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to argue that the District Court erred in 
applying the 2012 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, under 
which she was eligible for the enhancement, thereby resulting 
in a higher Guidelines range in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  These allegations relate back to Santarelli’s initial 
habeas petition, even setting aside our directive that courts 
should construe pro se pleadings liberally, which the District 
Court failed to apply.  See, e.g., Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 
189, 198 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A habeas corpus petition prepared 
by a prisoner without legal assistance may not be skillfully 
drawn and should thus be read generously.”).  Further, 
Santarelli does not, as the District Court found, attempt to add 
a new, substantive claim for a violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause to her initial habeas petition through her Motion to 
Amend; rather, she seeks to clarify that her counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by allegedly failing to 
recognize that the District Court allegedly sentenced her in 
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 Thus, the allegations contained in Santarelli’s Motion to 
Amend relate back to her initial habeas petition pursuant to 
Rule 15(c), and the District Court erred in denying the Motion 
to Amend.  Therefore, we will reverse the District Court’s 
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order denying the Motion to Amend and will remand to the 
District Court to consider the merits of Santarelli’s initial 
habeas petition as amended by the allegations contained in the 
Motion to Amend. 
IV. 
 While the appeal with respect to the District Court’s 
denial of her Motion to Amend was pending, Santarelli filed in 
our Court her Motion to File Subsequent Petition, which she 
styled as a motion for leave to file a “second or successive” 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h).  
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a petitioner is required to file a motion in 
the appropriate court of appeals for authorization to file a 
“second or successive” habeas petition in the relevant district 
court for consideration of the petition’s merits.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(A).  AEDPA thus requires courts of appeals to 
perform a “gatekeeping” function with respect to “second or 
successive” habeas petitions, insofar as “[a] second or 
successive motion must be certified by a court of appeals to 
rely upon either ‘newly discovered evidence’ showing 
innocence or ‘a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable.’”  United States v. Peppers, 
899 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h)). 
 Whether AEDPA requires courts of appeals to perform 
this gatekeeping function in a given set of circumstances 
hinges on the answer to a separate, baseline question:  Is the 
subsequent habeas petition in fact “second or successive”?  
AEDPA, however, does not define what constitutes a “second 
or successive” petition.  In this case, we are asked to decide 
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whether a petition is “second or successive” for purposes of 
AEDPA when it is filed during the pendency of appellate 
proceedings concerning a district court’s denial of a 
petitioner’s initial habeas petition.  We hold that a subsequent 
habeas petition is not “second or successive” under AEDPA 
when a petitioner files such a petition prior to her exhaustion 
of appellate remedies with respect to the denial of her initial 
habeas petition, and thus AEDPA does not  require us to 
perform the gatekeeping function prior to a petitioner’s filing 
such a subsequent petition in a district court.5 
 We previously have counseled that “the term ‘second 
and successive’ [i]s a term of art, which is not to be read 
literally.”  Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 
2005).  “Therefore, ‘a prisoner’s application is not second or 
successive simply because it follows an earlier federal 
petition.’”  Id. (quoting In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 
1998)).  Rather, we have held that a habeas petition is “second 
or successive” if it is filed after “the petitioner has expended 
the ‘one full opportunity to seek collateral review’ that AEDPA 
ensures.”  Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 413 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 
2010)) (holding that “a Rule 60(b) motion that raises a claim 
attacking the underlying criminal judgment must be a second 
or successive petition”). 
                                                 
5  As discussed below, however, depending on the 
outcome of a petitioner’s exercise of her appellate remedies 
with respect to the denial of her initial habeas petition, a 
subsequent habeas petition could later be construed as a 
“second or successive” habeas petition regardless of our 
holding that such a petition is not “second or successive” at the 
time of filing during the pendency of an appeal. 
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 The Government urges us to adopt a rule that would 
construe as “second or successive” all habeas petitions filed by 
a petitioner following a district court’s denial of her initial 
habeas petition, regardless of whether she has exhausted her 
appellate remedies.  In other words, the Government argues 
that we should interpret “one full opportunity to seek collateral 
review” to include an unstated qualifier:  “one full opportunity 
to seek collateral review” in the district court. 
 We reject that proffered interpretation, which runs 
counter to Supreme Court precedent on the finality of district 
court judgments in the AEDPA context.  For example, in Slack 
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2000), the Supreme Court 
held that a subsequent habeas petition was not “second or 
successive” even though the district court had previously 
dismissed the petitioner’s initial habeas petition for failure to 
exhaust his state remedies.  Further, in Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643 (1998), the Supreme Court held 
that a subsequent petition for relief on a claim was not “second 
or successive” even though that petitioner had raised the same 
claim in a prior habeas petition that the district court previously 
dismissed as premature.  See id. (“This may have been the 
second time that respondent had asked the federal courts to 
provide relief on his Ford claim, but this does not mean that 
there were two separate applications, the second of which was 
necessarily subject to § 2244(b).”).  Taken together, Slack and 
Stewart counsel that a subsequent habeas petition is not 
necessarily a “second or successive” petition simply because 
the district court has issued a “final” judgment denying a 
petitioner’s initial habeas petition within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Therefore, we hold that a subsequent habeas 
petition is “second or successive” if it is filed after “the 
petitioner has expended the ‘one full opportunity to seek 
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collateral review’ that AEDPA ensures,” Blystone, 664 F.3d at 
413 (quoting Urinyi, 607 F.3d at 320), which we interpret in 
this context as meaning after the petitioner has exhausted all of 
her appellate remedies with respect to her initial habeas 
petition or after the time for appeal has expired.  We thus join 
the Second Circuit in holding that “so long as appellate 
proceedings following the district court’s dismissal of the 
initial petition remain pending when a subsequent petition is 
filed, the subsequent petition does not come within AEDPA’s 
gatekeeping provisions for ‘second or successive’ petitions” at 
the time of the subsequent petition’s filing.  Whab v. United 
States, 408 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Ching v. United 
States, 298 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Clark v. 
United States, 764 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 2014) (“A motion to 
amend is not a second or successive § 2255 motion when it is 
filed before the adjudication of the initial § 2255 motion is 
complete—i.e., before the petitioner has lost on the merits and 
exhausted her appellate remedies.”). 
 The Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 
545 U.S. 524 (2005), does not compel a different result.  In 
Gonzalez, the Supreme Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion for 
relief from a district court’s final judgment or order is in fact a 
habeas petition if the motion “advances one or more ‘claims’” 
insofar as the motion “seeks to add a new claim for relief” or 
“attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on 
the merits.”  Id. at 532.  Applying the holding in Gonzalez, the 
Seventh Circuit, in Phillips v. United States, 668 F.3d 433, 435 
(7th Cir. 2012), held that a Rule 60(b) motion that was “directly 
addressed to the merits” was a “second or successive” habeas 
petition even though the petitioner filed the Rule 60(b) motion 
during the pendency of an appeal.  The Seventh Circuit’s 
holding in Phillips is generally consistent with our own 
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precedent:  “[A] Rule 60(b) motion that raises a claim attacking 
the underlying criminal judgment must be a second or 
successive petition because, the judgment having become final, 
the petitioner has expended the ‘one full opportunity to seek 
collateral review’ that AEDPA ensures.” Blystone, 664 F.3d at 
413 (quoting Urinyi, 607 F.3d at 320).  The holdings of these 
cases do not apply to the facts of our case, however, because 
we read the above-cited cases as solely concerning the inherent 
nature of Rule 60(b) motions; Santarelli’s Motion to File 
Subsequent Petition is not such a motion. 
 Nor does our holding, as the Tenth Circuit has implied, 
“undermine the policy against piecemeal litigation embodied 
in § 2244(b).”  Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 541 (10th Cir. 
2007).  That court cautioned that a holding such as ours would 
lead to “[m]ultiple habeas claims[’] . . . be[ing] successively 
raised without statutory constraint for as long as a first habeas 
case remained pending in the system.”  Id.  Such an assumption 
disregards the jurisdictional dynamics at play when a petitioner 
appeals a district court’s denial of her initial habeas petition. 
 If, as we hold here, a subsequent habeas petition is not 
a “second or successive” petition when it is filed during the 
pendency of an appeal of the district court’s denial of the 
petitioner’s initial habeas petition (the principal being that “[a] 
document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’”), that 
subsequent habeas petition should be construed as a motion to 
amend the initial habeas petition.  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
(1976)).  Further, as a result of our holding, such a liberally 
construed “motion to amend” should be filed in the district 
court in the first instance because such a motion is not a 
“second or successive” habeas petition and, therefore, a 
petitioner need not seek authorization from the court of appeals 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h).  While an appeal 
of the district court’s denial of the initial habeas petition is 
pending, however, that court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
“motion to amend” because “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal 
is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers 
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court 
of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the 
appeal.”  Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 
56, 58 (1982).  Therefore, the pendency of the appeal divests 
the district court of jurisdiction to consider the “motion to 
amend” unless and until the court of appeals remands the 
matter to the district court.  See Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 
F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a district court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider a motion to amend a complaint “[o]nce 
a timely notice of appeal has been made” to the court of 
appeals).  Thus, the resolution of the merits of the “motion to 
amend” should remain stayed pending the resolution of the 
appeal with respect to the initial habeas petition.  In the event 
that a petitioner exhausts her appellate remedies to no avail, the 
district court should refer the “motion to amend” to the court 
of appeals as a “second or successive” habeas petition because 
“the petitioner has,” at that point, “expended the ‘one full 
opportunity to seek collateral review’ that AEDPA ensures.” 
Blystone, 664 F.3d at 413 (quoting Urinyi, 607 F.3d at 320). 
 If, however, an appellate court vacates or reverses, in 
whole or in part, the district court’s denial of the initial habeas 
petition and remands the matter—as is the case here—the 
district court would again be vested with jurisdiction to 
consider the “motion to amend.”  Even if the matter is 
remanded to the district court as described above, the “motion 
to amend” nonetheless must satisfy not only the Rule 15 
standard for amending pleadings, but also the dictates of the 
 21 
abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, which “bar[s] claims that could 
have been raised in an earlier habeas corpus petition.”  
Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 817; see also Whab, 408 F.3d at 119 n.2 
(holding that “[t]raditional doctrines, such as abuse of the writ, 
continue to apply”).  Thus, we believe that our holding is a 
narrow one and represents a limited exception to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2244 and 2255(h) that is in keeping with AEDPA’s policy 
against piecemeal litigation. 
 Therefore, because Santarelli filed her Motion to File 
Subsequent Petition during the pendency of her appeal of the 
District Court’s denial of her Motion to Amend, her 
Subsequent Petition is not a “second or successive” habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h), and we construe 
her Motion to File Subsequent Petition as a motion to amend 
her initial habeas petition.  Thus, Santarelli should have filed 
the Motion to File Subsequent Petition directly in the District 
Court.  We therefore transfer the Motion to File Subsequent 
Petition to the District Court for consideration of the motion as 
if it had been filed in the first instance in the District Court, and 
it should construe the motion as a motion to amend the initial 
habeas petition.  We note that because we are remanding this 
matter for the District Court to consider the merits of 
Santarelli’s initial habeas petition as amended by the 
allegations contained in the Motion to Amend, it will be vested 
on remand with jurisdiction to consider the Motion to File 
Subsequent Petition. 
V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the order 
of the District Court denying the Motion to Amend, remand to 
it to consider the merits of Santarelli’s initial habeas petition as 
amended by the allegations contained in the Motion to Amend, 
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and transfer the Motion to File Subsequent Petition to that 
court to consider, in the first instance, whether Santarelli 
should be permitted to amend her initial habeas petition to 
incorporate the allegations contained in the Subsequent 
Petition. 
